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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the patent rights in the form of a patent application. He will receive
capital gains treatment on the proceeds and his controlled corpora-
tion will be allowed a depreciation allowance once the patent is ap-
proved.
The Commissioner could rectify this situation by simply revoking
Revenue Ruling 69-482 and acquiescing to the Poole decision. This
action would make § 1235 the exclusive means by which the holder
of a patent could receive capital gains benefits on its sale. Perhaps
the results reached in Stahl, Chu, and Davis will convince the Com-
missioner to reconsider his position and prompt him to accept the
interpretation of § 1235 that is consistent with Congressional intent.
JEFFREY LYNN WmLs
A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR MATERIAL
MISSTATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS IN TENDER
OFFERS UNDER § 14(e) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Prompted by the increased use of cash tender offers' as a means
of gaining control of publicly held corporations,2 Congress in 1968
enacted the Williams Act amendment to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 3 Included in the Williams Act is § 14(e),4 a special antifraud
'A cash tender offer is a technique whereby the offeror, who seeks to obtain control
of a target corporation, publicly offers to purchase a specified amount of the target's
outstanding stock. The offeror thus requests the present stockholders of the target
corporation to "tender" their shares, at a fixed price customarily in excess of the
current market value. An exchange offer, or share tender offer, is similar, except that
in return for their tendered shares target shareholders receive stock in the acquiring
corporation, rather than cash. See generally Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquis-
ition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1967).
2H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News 2811,
2812 (1968). See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REv.
135 (1967).
3Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-49, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1968), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970). The Williams Act was a legislative response to a
"gap" in the federal securities laws concerning disclosure with respect to shifts in
corporate control. Although exchange offers were subject to the requirement of the
Securities Act of 1933 and proxy contests were regulated under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, tender offers for cash were exempt from disclosure requirements. See H.R.
REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812-13
(1968); 1 A. BROMBERG, SECuRrriEs LAW: FRAUD--SEC RULE 10B-5 § 6.3 (111) (1969)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]; Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap
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provision designed to insure disclosure to investors of all material
facts in connection with tender offers.5 In the first appellate case
considering § 14(e),' Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit observed
that the provision "largely tracks the substantive provisions of Rule
10b-5"7 and suggested that § 14(e) was "very likely, except perhaps
for any bearing it may have on the issue of standing, only a codifica-
tion of existing case law."8 This conclusion was probably prompted
both by the similarity in language of § 14(e) and Rule 10b-5, and by
the fact that, prior to the Williams Act, Rule 10b-5 was the provision
invoked by persons seeking damages or injunctive relief for alleged
in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 499 (1967). Extensive commen-
tary accompanied the proposal and eventual passage of the Williams Act. Numerous
sources are cited in 1 A. BROMBERG § 6.3 (111) at 116 n.21.
4Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
5Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request,
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsec-
tion, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative.
As it initially appeared in the Williams Act, § 14(e) consisted of only the first sentence
quoted above. The second and last sentence, granting the SEC rulemaking authority,
was added to § 14(e) as part of a series of amendments to the Williams Act in 1970,
see notes 21-27 and accompanying text infra, but did not affect the operation of the
antifraud provision. Throughout this article reference to § 14(e) will be to the first
sentence of that provision, unless otherwise provided.
'Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969).
71d. at 945 (footnote omitted). Promulgated by the SEC pursuant to statutory
authority granted in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970),
Rule 10b-5 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a)[1] To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b)[2] To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c)[3] To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
1409 F.2d at 940-41.
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misrepresentations and other fraudulent activities in tender offer sit-
uations Federal courts applying § 14(e) have thus far echoed Judge
Friendly's comments and, beyond determinations of standing, have
treated claims under the new antifraud provision as they would
claims under the similarly worded Rule 10b-5.1 1
However, while district and appellate courts"1 have unanimously
incorporated the elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action into claims
asserted under § 14(e), those courts also have been unanimous in
their failure to consider whether such wholesale extraction is proper.
In light of the specialized nature of § 14(e), which is applicable only
to tender offers, as opposed to the broad proscriptions of Rule 10b-5,
this apparent oversight by the courts has led to the questionable
practice of equating Rule 10b-5 with § 14(e). Particularly suspect is
the proposition, as yet uncontroverted, that the standard of culpabil-
ity for liability in a private action for damages under § 14(e)"2 should
mirror the standard applicable to claims asserted under Rule 10b-5.
'The prohibitions of Rule 10b-5 encompass a broad range of activities involving
transactions in securities. Plaintiffs asserting fraud in tender offer transactions had to
overcome a substantial impediment under 10b-5 in the purchaser-seller limitation on
standing originally enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum doctrine, premised upon the
language "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" in lOb-5, generally
limits that antifraud remedy to those who have either bought or sold securities. Thus,
defeated tender offerors and non-tendering shareholders often encountered difficulty
qualifying as proper parties to invoke the rule. See, e.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syra-
cuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). But
cf. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). This obstacle
was removed by the enactment of § 14(e) which, as Judge Friendly noted in Electronic
Specialty, 409 F.2d at 945 n.6, omits the purchaser-seller language of Rule 10b-5 in
favor of the words "in connection with any tender offer. . . or any solicitation. . . in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer."
"oSee, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), petition
for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. May 8, 1974) (No. 73,671); Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973);
Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1973). The courts have thus interpreted
the relaxation of the standing requirement to be the only change from Rule 10b-5
incorporated in the new provision.
"The Supreme Court has not yet heard any cases involving § 14(e), having so far
refused to grant petitions for certiorari. E.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
"Section 14(e) does not provide explicitly for a private right of action. However,
by analogy from cases granting private remedies under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, e.g.,
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and under § 14(a)
and Rule 14a-9, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), courts have inferred
such a right. See, e.g., H.K. Porter v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir.
1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 361 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). In Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.
19741
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Given the lack of consensus among the circuits on whether a negli-
gence or scienter'3 standard should be invoked under Rule 10b-5,'4 a
more logical analysis would base determination of the proper stan-
dard for § 14(e) upon an independent interpretation of that provision.
Such an examination of the language of § 14(e), the purpose for which
it was enacted, and its relation to other antifraud provisions under
the securities laws indicates not only that § 14(e) is distinguishable
from Rule 10b-5,'1 but also that the two main clauses of § 14(e) are
functionally distinct, and that the standard for liability under these
clauses should vary accordingly'.
That the clauses of § 14(e) are separable on a functional basis is
evidenced by their linguistic dissimilarity. The first clause of
§ 14(e),16 which prohibits misstatements and omissions of material
facts, appears to require the affirmative disclosure of material facts
of the nature enumerated in the specific tender offer disclosure provi-
sions of the Williams Act. 7 The clause contains no language connot-
1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. May 8, 1974) (No. 73,671), the
court explained:
We take this opportunity to make explicit what has been implicit
a private right of action may be inferred from Section 14(e).
Not only do we thereby follow the overwhelming weight of authority,
but we reaffirm the importance of private litigation to the effective
enforcement of the securities laws.
Id. at 596 n.20.
3For a discussion of the distinction between negligence and scienter, see note 33
infra.
"See notes 30-49 and accompanying text infra.
"See generally 2 A. BROMBERG § 8.4 (440-49). Cf. Note, Defensive Tactics Em-
ployed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104
(1969) (recommending that § 14(e) be interpreted independently of Rule 10b-5, fearing
that courts would overlook legislative intent not to tip the balance of power away from
target management in contested tender offers).
"See note 5 supra.
"The principal disclosure requirement in the Williams Act dealing specifically
with tender offers was § 14(d)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970). Under
§ 14(d)(1), a tender offeror who, if successful, will become the beneficial owner of more
than 5% of any class of equity securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act
must, by the time of the offer, have filed with the SEC a statement containing informa-
tion specified in § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970). This latter provision, which
requires disclosure of information up to 10 days after a person has acquired more than
5% of any class of registered securities by whatever method, requires such information
as the background and identity of the offeror, the source of funds used to purchase the
securities, any plans or proposals the offeror may have to change significantly the
structure of the target if the purpose of the offer is to acquire control, and the number
of target corporation shares already owned by the offeror. See Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-1 (1972), and Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1972). In addition, the
offeror must include similar but less extensive information with a tender offer pub-
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ing a requirement of scienter, and is seemingly directed toward in-
stances of inadequate disclosure, whether in the form of affirmative
misrepresentations, half-truths, or total nondisclosure."8 On the other
hand, the language of the second clause, which proscribes "fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative" acts and practices, does seem to
introduce a scienter requirement. The apparent objects of this clause
are the various manipulative practices employed during some tender
offers, and not the failures to disclose covered in the first clause.
Admittedly, material misrepresentations or omissions under the first
clause of § 14(e) could be interpreted to constitute deceptive acts or
practices under the second clause, thereby refuting the proposition
that the clauses are separable. However, unless the first clause is read
to encompass activity other than deceptive or manipulative prac-
tices, it is rendered mere surplusage.'9 Congress surely did not intend
the detailed language of the first clause of § 14(e) to be subsumed
within the second clause;" a more logical conclusion is that the two
clauses were designed to proscribe different types of conduct.
Although there is little in the legislative history of the Williams
Act itself to either support or weaken the proposition that Congress
lished or sent to the target shareholders. Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1972).
Furthermore, persons advising target shareholders to accept or reject a tender offer for
registered securities are required under Rule 14d-4 to file with the SEC information
specified in Schedule 14D.
For a more complete discussion of the operation of § 14(d) and the remainder of
the Williams Act provisions, see 1 A. BROMBERG § 6.3; Brown, The Scope of the Wil-
liams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAW. 1637 (1971).
"Similar contentions have been made by some commentators concerning the cov-
erage of the clauses of Rule 10b-5. See note 45 infra.
"Cf. Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
824, 826 (1965).
"The contention that the first and second clauses of § 14(e) should operate inde-
pendently is supported by a comparison of § 14(e) with Rule 10b-5 which, because of
the similarity in language, some apparently believe was the model for the later provi-
sion. The similarity and overlap between Rule 10b-5 clauses (1) and (3) have been well
acknowledged, and distinctions between the two clauses are drawn with difficulty.
1 A. BROMBERG § 2.6(1). If Congress fashioned § 14(e) from Rule 10b-5, apparently it
must have recognized this duplicity, and thus consolidated in the second clause of
§ 14(e) clauses (1) and (3) of Rule 10b-5. This possibility, and the similarity between
clauses (1) and (3), is illustrated by the fact that while many commentators have
asserted that the second clause of § 14(e) reproduces Rule 10b-5(3), e.g., 1 A. BROMBERG
§ 6.3 (211), some describe it as resembling Rule 10b-5(1). E.g., Folk, Civil Liabilities
Under The Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 199, 250 (1969).
This consolidation and elimination of repetitive language indicates that Congress de-
sired to exclude whatever language was not necessary for the intended functioning of
§ 14(e). Assuming that Congress thus omitted all extraneous language, the fact that
Rule 10b-5(2) was "preserved" in the first clause of § 14(e) is evidence that it was
designed to maintain independent vitality.
1974]
738 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
intended the two clauses of § 14(e) to be functionally distinct, an
amendment to § 14(e) and its history indicate that the separate oper-
ation of the clauses was congressionally contemplated. In 1970,
§ 14(e) was amended by the addition of the last sentence, giving the
SEC rulemaking power to "define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative. ' '21 The language of the amendment essentially
reproduces that of the second clause of § 14(e), while avoiding any
mention of material misstatements and omissions.
In describing the rulemaking provision, the House Report stated:
"The section would amend Section 14(c) [sic, 14(e)] of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, which prohibits false statements and fraudulent
or deceptive practices . . . . It would grant to the Commission rule-
making power to . . . prevent fraudulent, deceptive and manipula-
tive practices .... ,,22 A distinction is clearly drawn between mere
false statements, which should be covered by the first clause of
§ 14(e), and the deceptive or manipulative practices prohibited by
the second clause. The operation of the amendment, which includes
language strongly connoting a requirement of scienter, is restricted to
that part of § 14(e) which proscribes such practices. The likely pur-
pose of the addition, as indicated in the House Report, was "to allow
the Commission to deal more effectively with the devices sometimes
employed on both sides in contested tender offers." The contem-
plated objects of the addition to § 14(e), and therefore the objects of
§ 14(e)'s second clause, include such tactics as phony mergers, un-
warranted dividend declarations, and manipulations of market price
during the offering period, 4 but not the affirmative duty of manage-
ment and offerors to disclose material information to shareholders.
25
The type of affirmative disclosure required by the first clause of
21See note 5 supra.
"H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5025,
5030 (1970) (emphasis added).
1id. at 5028.
"For discussion of some of these tactics, see Schmults & Kelly, Cash Takeover
Bids-Defensive Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1967).
"1The desire of the SEC to regulate these tactics is shown by a memorandum it
filed urging passage of the 1970 Amendment:
As it now exists, section 14(e) prohibits false statements and fraudu-
lent or deceptive practices in connection with tender offers, but does
not specifically grant the Commission any rulemaking authority to
deal with such practices.
H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5025, 5034
(1970) (emphasis added). The distinction drawn between the operation of the clauses
of § 14(e) is again apparent.
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§ 14(e) had already been more specifically effectuated to some extent
by the particular tender offer provisions such as § 14(d).12 With the
amendment to § 14(e), Congress gave the Commission power to im-
plement the second clause's proscription of deceptive acts and prac-
tices. Congress seemingly acknowledged this difference in the scope
of the first and second clauses of § 14(e), as did the SEC," and,
consistent with a theory of separability for the purpose of determining
standards of liability, left the prohibition of misstatements and omis-
sions of material facts unaffected by the scienter language in the
amendment. Nevertheless, courts have not distinguished between the
clauses when considering alleged violations of § 14(e) but have chosen
rather to incorporate the substantive elements of a Rule 10b-5 viola-
tion into § 14(e) as a whole.
This incorporation by the courts has been due largely to the sub-
stantially similar language of Rule 10b-5 and § 14(e), both of which
are devoid of any express mention of a scienter requirement. The first
clause of § 14(e), dealing with material misstatements and omissions,
duplicates the wording of Rule 10b-5(2).2 The second clause approxi-
mates Rule 10b-5(3), with the exception of the addition of the word
"manipulative." 9 Thus, courts construing § 14(e) have understanda-
bly concluded that actions under the new provision should be based
on the same elements required under its presumed precursor, Rule
10b-5. The judicial reliance placed upon Rule 10b-5 cases for deter-
mining whether scienter or negligence is required in private damage
actions under § 14(e) necessitates an examination of the culpability
standard for that Rule.
The controversy surrounding the scienter requirement under Rule
10b-5 has been variously and appropriately labeled the "great de-
bate," 3 "this thicket,"3' and "the still clouded cauldron in which the
oracles continue to stew." 2 The federal courts agree that the specific
2See note 17 supra.
"See note 25 supra.
'See notes 5 and 7 supra.
2'See notes 5 and 7 supra.
-Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
3'Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969).
3 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,826 at 90,103 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). On the dispute
whether scienter is required under Rule 10b-5, see generally Bucklo, Scienter and Rule
10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972); Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions
Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. REv. 482 (1970); Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a
Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45
1974]
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intent to defraud required in common law deceit actions is unneces-
sary for recovery under Rule 10b-5.3 Nevertheless, the circuits are
divided over the nature of conduct sufficiently objectionable to war-
rant liability. The First," Second," Third, 6 Fifth,37 and Sixth38 Cir-
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206 (1970); Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057
(1969); Comment, Scienter in Private Damage Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57 GEO. L.J.
1108 (1969); Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in Private Suits Under SEC Anti-Fraud
Rule 10b-5, 63 MIcH. L. Rxv. 1070 (1965); Note, Rule 10b-5: Elements of a Private
Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 541 (1968); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation
Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 824 (1965). See also Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 276-91 (2d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
33E.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for
cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. May 8, 1974) (No. 73,671). 'There is no question
of requiring plaintiffs to prove scienter in its strict common law sense. . . .The trend
in the federal courts has been toward a more relaxed test." Id. at 606. See also Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
913 (1970). Inconsistent use of language to describe various degrees of culpability has
probably contributed to the confusion surrounding the scienter requirement and Rule
10b-5. Thus, when courts state that proof of intent to defraud is not required under
Rule 10b-5, they refer apparently to a conscious, bad faith misrepresentation with an
intent to mislead, excluding modem concepts of scienter. See Bucklo, Scienter and
Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972). Cf. Derry v. Peek, House of Lords 1889, 14
App. Cas. 337; W. PRossmn, LAw OF ToRTs § 107 (4th ed. 1971). Courts today normally
interpret scienter to mean some degree of awareness, either knowing misrepresentation
or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a representation. See, e.g., Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973). Professor Bromberg suggests that the
same conduct may be more accurately described through knowledge criteria, that is,
as either actual or constructive knowledge of the falsity of a representation. 2 A.
BROMBERG § 8.4 (504). Accord, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 396-98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (Mansfield, J., concurring and
dissenting) (actual knowledge or notice of misrepresentation).
A negligent misrepresentation, on the other hand, is one which presumably could
have been prevented through diligent investigation. Such a misrepresentation is not
entirely innocent but is not so careless as to warrant constructive knowledge, as in
cases of recklessness. See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562
(1972).
31E.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Carr v. Warner, 137 F.
Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955).
3E.g., Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1973); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971). Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
The Second Circuit's most recent judicial pronouncement of the correct standard for
liability under Rule 10b-5 appears in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (1973), an
en banc proceeding in which the negligence standard was specifically rejected. The
court described the culpability necessary to establish liability under Rule 10b-5 as
"willful or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 1306. Nevertheless, three of the ten
judges hearing the case joined with Judge Hays in his partial concurrence and dissent,
calling for imposition of liability upon an exonerated outside director on the basis of
negligence. Id. at 1311-20.
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cuits apparently require a showing of scienter prior to awarding dam-
ages under Rule 10b-5. On the other hand, decisions in the Seventh, 0
Eighth, 0 Ninth,4 and Tenth 2 Circuits indicate that liability may be
grounded upon proof of mere negligence, and that actual or imputed
knowledge of falsity is unnecessary."
"E.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 874 (1972).
nThe Fifth Circuit recently declined to elaborate on the exact degree of wrongdo-
ing required, but stated that "some culpability, beyond mere negligence" was neces-
sary. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for
cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. May 8, 1974) (No. 73,671). See also Clement A.
Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988
(1971); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
3E.g., Golob v. Nauman, Vandervoort, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. 93,979 (N.D.
Ohio 1972). Cf. Mader v. Armel, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP.
T 93,027 (S.D. Ohio 1971), afl'd, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023
(1972).
"E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 29 n.45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 925 (1972); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
10E.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
"E.g., Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1971);
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). In a most novel and potentially significant decision, the Ninth
Circuit recently reinterpreted Royal Air and Ellis, maintaining that the proper ap-
proach in determining liability in Rule 10b-5 requires a case-by-case determination of
whether a defendant has satisfied his particular duty of disclosure under the Rule, the
extent of which is to be determined from the particular facts and circumstances. White
v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). Noting the difficulties inherent in attempting
to apply a blanket standard to all Rule 10b-5 situations, the court rejected the tradi-
tional negligence or scienter concepts, and chose rather to adopt a "flexible duty
standard" approach. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the contention that
negligence would never be sufficient for imposition of liability under Rule 10b-5. Al-
though the reason for the latter rejection was that negligence or non-negligence was
no longer a factor in the Ninth Circuit's Rule 10b-5 liability analysis, at the same time
the possibility of liability for negligence was clearly admitted, since in some circum-
stances a defendant's negligent nondisclosure will breach his duty to disclose. In par-
ticular, the court stated:
Where the defendant derives great benefit from a relationship of ex-
treme trust and confidence with the plaintiff, the defendant knowing
that plaintiff completely relies upon him for information to which he
has ready access, but to which plaintiff has no access, the law imposes
a duty upon the defendant to use extreme care in assuring that all
material information is accurate and disclosed.
Id. at 736.
"E.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 466 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
One status of a scienter standard in the Fourth Circuit is unclear. Compare
Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 545 (D. Md. 1971), with Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971).
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The conflict over the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 arises
first from contrary interpretations of the relation between the lan-
guage of § 10(b) and that of the second clause of Rule 10b-5. Propo-
nents of a negligence standard note that the broad language of Rule
10b-5(2), which prohibits material misstatements and omissions,
alone implies no scienter requirement." These courts and commenta-
tors stress the separability of Rule 10b-5(2) from the scienter-
connoting subsections of the rule,45 and they contend that by prohib-
iting in § 10(b) "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe,"46 Congress granted the SEC broad authority to define
and proscribe unacceptable conduct. Scienter adherents, on the
other hand, focus on the scienter language in § 10(b), which prohibits
"manipulative and deceptive" devices, and conclude that the em-
powering legislation is an effective limitation on the operation of the
rule. Under this view, imposition of liability for mere negligent omis-
sions or misrepresentations would transgress the congressional grant
of authority to the SEC.48
In further support of a scienter requirement under Rule 10b-5,
reference is often made to older provisions of the securities laws which
prohibit conduct similar to that proscribed by Rule 10b-5.11 Since
§ 11 and § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193311 in effect prohibit
"See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
"Rule 10b-5(1) prohibits "devices" and schemes to defraud, and Rule 10b-5(3)
similarly prohibits acts which operate as a "fraud or deceit." For commentary in favor
of treating Rule 10b-5(2) separately, see, e.g., Comment, Rule 10b-5: Elements of a
Private Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 541 (1968); Comment, Negligent Misrepre-
sentation Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 824 (1965). Contra, 2 A. BROMBERG
§ 8.4 (505); Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48
N.C.L. REV. 482 (1970) (noting that most courts do not distinguish between the subsec-
tions of 10b-5, and asserting that the three clauses should be treated alike).
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970).
"See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
"See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1305 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. 6 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3883-88 (Supp. 1969).
"See generally 2 A. BROMBERG § 8.4 (506). Securities Act of 1933 § 11 and § 12(2)
proscribe material misstatements and omissions in registration statements and in
offers or sales of securities, respectively. Liability is "strict" in each provision, in the
sense that a defendant has available only the "due diligence" defense. He bears the
burden of proving a "reasonable ground to believe" and actual belief in the truthful-
ness of statements made, to avoid liability under § 11. See generally Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Similarly, he must prove that he "did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known" of any mis-
statement or omission, to escape liability under § 12(2). See Securities Act of 1933
§§ 11, 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k,1 (1970).
-15 U.S.C. § 77k,1 (1970).
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negligent misstatements,5' implementation of a negligence standard
under Rule 10b-5 would purportedly emasculate these earlier express
liability provisions5 2 which are accompanied by various procedural
limitations.3 A negligence standard for actions brought under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 would permit plaintiffs to circumvent those proce-
dural restrictions, thereby providing a remedy Congress did not in-
tend.-4 To avoid this result, many courts require that a greater show-
ing, that of scienter, must be made by plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5.5 5
The scienter-negligence dispute under Rule 10b-5 is further exac-
erbated by conflicting policy considerations. Basically, negligence
standard proponents" stress the goals, often ascribed to the securities
laws, of fair dealing and free access to information for the investing
public.57 Presumably, the higher degree of care occasioned by a negli-
gence standard will more surely guarantee greater disclosure and thus
the achievement of those objectives. 8 Scienter adherents, on the
other hand, assert that imposition of the higher duty of care necessi-
tated by a negligence standard will discourage individuals from seek-
ing or accepting directorships and may produce inflated damage re-
coveries.
Finally, recent support for a scienter standard has been discerned
from the fact that, despite the broad negligence language employed
in some opinions, courts have never imposed liability in a Rule 10b-
5 private damage action for mere negligent conduct. 9 Interesting
5 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd
inpart on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
ZSee, e.g., Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321, 323-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Cf.
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1298-99, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973).
"Under both § 11 and § 12(2), plaintiffs are subject to a limitation statute of one
year after discovery of a misrepresentation has been or should have been made and
may also be required to post a security bond.
5 See cases cited note 42 supra.
OSee, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), in which
the court states "[W]hen, to conduct actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act, there is
added the ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes actionable under § 10(b) of
the 1934 Act and the Rule .... Id. at 787.
"E.g., Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CH. L.
REv. 824 (1965).
51See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (reiterating the
securities law's philosophy of full disclosure).
The theory that imposition of liability for negligent material misstatements and
omissions will encourage full disclosure is not universally accepted. See, e.g., Bucklo,
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972).
"Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562
(1972).
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though this observation may be, the clear language of those cases
applying a negligence standard should not be dismissed. The inevita-
ble conclusion is that the scienter question under Rule 10b-5 remains
unresolved. For this reason alone, the wisdom of interpreting § 14(e)
in exactly the same manner as Rule 10b-5 is debatable, and a decision
to read the new provision in such a way should be prefaced by at least
a thorough judicial analysis of the section.
However, only two courts have specifically addressed the scienter-
negligence conflict with regard to § 14(e),60 and neither court ques-
tioned whether considerations relevant in determining a standard for
liability under Rule 10b-5 were equally applicable to both clauses of
§ 14(e). In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.," the
Second Circuit noted the "virtually identical" proscriptions of § 14(e)
and Rule 10b-5 and stated: "[i]n determining whether § 14(e) viola-
tions were committed in the instant case, we shall follow the princi-
ples developed under Rule 10b-5 regarding the elements of such viola-
tions. 162 In this suit by a defeated tender offeror, Chris-Craft, against
the target management, a competing offeror, and the underwriter for
6 Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. May 8, 1974) (No. 73,671); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Most of
the cases arising under § 14(e) have involved requests for injunctive relief. E.g., So-
nesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973); Gulf &
W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Susquehanna
Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970); Electronic Specialty Co.
v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc.
v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd, 425 F.2d
842 (2d Cir. 1970).
"480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (noted at 51 TEXAS L.
REv. 1444 (1973)). A consolidation of three district court actions, the case stemmed
from the following facts. In an attempt to gain control of Piper Aircraft, Chris-Craft
in January, 1969, announced a cash tender offer for the purchase of Piper shares. In
resisting the takeover attempt, Piper management, comprised primarily of the Piper
family, in correspondence with its shareholders, described the offer as "inadequate";
announced an agreement to sell to Grumman Aircraft a large block of unissued shares,
omitting mention of an accompanying "put" agreement under which Grumman could
reverse the sale; and entered agreement with Bangor Punta Corp. whereby Piper man-
agement would transfer its one-third holdings in Piper for Bangor Punta shares, and
Bangor Punta would attempt to gain control of Piper through a subsequent exchange
offer. Piper management recommended acceptance of the latter offer, but it did not
mention that a monetary reward to the Piper family would accompany successful
takeover by Bangor Punta. Furthermore, in conjunction with the exchange offer, Ban-
gor Punta failed to disclose h substantial impending financial loss. Eight months after
the initial tender offer, Bangor Punta had achieved a majority stockholder position in
Piper with 51% of the Piper shares, thus repulsing the Chris-Craft takeover attempt.
62480 F.2d at 362.
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the competing offer, Chris-Craft alleged as the basis for its cause of
action material misstatements and omissions to Piper shareholders.
The court categorized materiality 3 and culpability as the key con-
cepts in determining whether violations of § 14(e) had occurred.
Judge Timbers explained that the necessary culpability would be
shown under Rule 10b-5 or § 14(e) if a defendant knowingly or reck-
lessly failed to discharge his duty to disclose material facts in repre-
sentations to investors." By application of this scienter standard,
each of the defendants was found guilty of more than mere negligence
in failing to apprise Piper shareholders of material information, and
Chris-Craft was awarded monetary and injunctive relief.
In a concurring opinion in Chris-Craft, Judge Mansfield treated
similarly the issue of scienter under § 14(e). After noting that the
Second Circuit requires some form of scienter in a private damage
action under Rule 10b-5, Judge Mansfield observed that "[n]o rea-
son has been advanced for a different standard in the enforcement of
§ 14(e), the language of which is substantially the same as that found
in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."69 He concluded that in § 14(e) and § 10(b)
Congress intended not to reach "merely negligent" misrepresen-
tations or omissions, but only those accompanied by some degree of
awareness, or scienter, of the party responsible."6 Had Congress in-
tended to impose liability subject only to a "due diligence" defense"
or to confine liability to willful and intentional misrepresentations,
language such as that in § 11 of the 1933 Act" or § 9(e) of the 1934
Act,69 respectively, could have been employed in § 14(e) and § 10(b).
111d. at 362-63. The court applied the materiality test adopted for Rule lOb-5 in
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965):
"whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact misrepresented]
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question,'" and in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
61480 F.2d at 363. Judge Timbers described the culpability standard as follows: "In
sum . . . the standard for determining liability under § 14(e) . . .is whether plaintiff
has established that defendant either (1) knew the material facts that were misstated
or omitted, or (2) failed or refused to ascertain such facts when they were available to
him or could have been discovered by him with reasonable effort." Id. at 364.5Id. at 397.
"Support for this conclusion was based on use of the words "fraudulent," "decep-
tive," and "manipulative" in § 14(e), together with the somewhat similar language and
the legislative history of § 10(b). Id.
17See note 49 supra.
"See note 49 supra.
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970), declares liable
any person who "willfully participates" in any of a number of prohibited activities,
including the sale of securities, by means of materially false or misleading statements.
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Finally, Judge Mansfield argued that a scienter test"0 under § 10(b),
Rule 10b-5, and § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, and § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 1
would effectively distinguish those provisions from § 11 and § 12 of
the Securities Act, which place on defendants the burden of estab-
lishing "due diligence." 2
Recently in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,73 the Fifth Circuit
expressed its agreement with the Second Circuit's evaluation of the
culpability standard for § 14(e) violations. After determining that an
uncontested offer to purchase shares in connection with a merger
agreement constituted a "tender offer,"74 and that a non-tendering
shareholder had standing to assert a damage claim for a § 14(e)
violation, the court asserted:
Congress adopted in Section 14(e) the substantive language of
the second paragraph of Rule 10b-5 and in so doing accepted
the precedential baggage those words have carried over the
years . . . Once standing is established, therefore, the analy-
sis under Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5 is identical.
75
With respect to culpability as an element of proof, the court repeated
that "the elements to be proved to establish a violation of Section
14(e) are identical to those under the Rule. '7 The court acknowl-
edged the uncertain status of scienter requirements among the cir-
cuits and, preferring not to delineate precisely the scienter standard
for the Fifth Circuit, noted only that some culpability beyond mere
negligence was necessary.
77
"Under Judge Mansfield's formulation, the scienter requirement would be satis-
fied if a defendant "(1) knew the essential facts and failed to disclose them, or (2) failed
or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure in disclosure, to
apprise himself of the facts under circumstances where he could reasonably have
ascertained and disclosed them without any extraordinary effort." 480 F.2d at 398.
'Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Section 17(a) is consid-
ered to be the statutory precursor of Rule 10b-5, and their language is remarkably
similar.
72See note 49 supra.
-489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. May
8, 1974) (No. 73,671).
4Id. at 596-99. The term "tender offer" is not defined in the securities laws, and
commentators have not reached a consensus on its precise meaning. Id. at 596. See
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 86 HARv. L. Rxv. 1250 (1973).
11489 F.2d at 605. As authority for this proposition the court cited only Chris-Craft
and Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969).
11489 F.2d at 606.
77Id. Since plaintiff Smallwood had not requested that a special issue on culpabil-
ity be submitted to the jury, that issue was deemed decided in defendant's favor, as
was the lower court judgment. The appellate court did not view the evidence as suffi-
cient to warrant an overriding finding of culpability as a matter of law. Id. at 606-07.
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An examination of Chris-Craft, Smallwood, and other cases78
which have considered private damage actions under § 14(e) reveals
that a number of factors arguing against the blanket grafting of Rule
10b-5 standards to § 14(e) have apparently been overlooked. One
potentially distinguishing factor concerns the varying scope of opera-
tion of the respective provisions. Unlike Rule 10b-5, which regulates
an extremely broad spectrum of activities involving the purchase or
sale of securities, § 14(e) is directed toward one specific set of events:
the use of the tender offer to secure a portion of a corporation's
stock. 9 This specificity of purpose and scope of § 14(e) should render
the provision sufficiently distinct from Rule 10b-5 to warrant an inde-
pendent interpretation on the issue of the existence of a scienter
requirement. Possibly the myriad unrelated purchase and sale situa-
tions subject to the proscriptions of Rule 10b-5 have contributed to
the uncertainty surrounding the standard of fault under that provi-
sion. In contrast, the restricted scope of § 14(e) presents the courts
with an opportunity to establish uniform standards far more amena-
ble to consistent application. Furthermore, this unique nature of §
14(e) should obviate the need to impute a scienter requirement to the
first clause of § 14(e) for the purpose of avoiding alternative remedies
under the securities laws,80 as some courts have deemed necessary
under Rule 10b-5.1'
Another significant distinguishing aspect of § 14(e) is that unlike
the superficially similar Rule 10b-5, which is ultimately circum-
scribed by the provisions of its authorizing legislation § 10(b), the
new tender offer antifraud provision is itself congressionally promul-
gated and is thus subject to no such limitation. For this reason, the
contention that a scienter standard must be read into Rule 10b-5(2)
'E.g., H.K. Porter, Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Dyer
v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971); Emmi v. First-
Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 629 (D. Me. 1971); Fabrikant v. Jacobellis,
[1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,686 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Neuman
v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. 92,591
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
"Section 14(e) applies to all tender offers, both those for cash and those for securi-
ties, regardless of whether the offers are subject to the requirements-of § 14(d). See
Henry Heide, Inc., [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,838, at
81,836 (SEC Staff Letter, May 1, 1972). Prior to the 1970 amendments to the Williams
Act, exchange offers were exempt from the disclosure requirements of § 14(d). The
amendments eliminated the exemption from § 14(d), though § 14(e) had already been
applied to an exchange offer in Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970). See H.R.
EP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5025, 5028 (1970).
112 A. BROMBERG § 8.4 (440).
"See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra.
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because of the wording of § 10(b)82 is clearly inapplicable to § 14(e).
Likewise inapposite is the "precedential baggage" which imposes a
scienter standard for Rule 10b-5 in its entirety, at least to the extent
that such precedent is founded upon the purportedly overriding lan-
guage of § 10(b).Y
Arguably, Congress may have intended to impute to § 14(e) the
pre-existing substantive elements of violations under Rule 10b-5, in-
cluding a requirement of scienter. However, since the law concerning
scienter under Rule 10b-5 in 1968 was ambiguous at best, arguments
that a negligence standard was intended are equally persuasive. An
emphasis on extending to §14(e) the existing liability standard for
Rule 10b-5 is thus inconclusive, since reliance on Rule 10b-5 case law
will produce the rather anomalous result of different law for different
federal circuits. Surely Congress did not mean to subject the new
antifraud provision to the conflicting judicial treatment formerly ac-
corded Rule 10b-5 with respect to scienter8 4 A more logical and sensi-
ble conclusion is that Congress intended the plain language of § 14(e)
to be given full effect, apart from the confines of reasoning peculiar
to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, thereby avoiding an otherwise inevitable
2See text at note 48 supra.
'Courts construing § 14(e) have often equated its language with that of Rule 10b-
5 and § 10(b). See, e.g., text accompanying note 65 supra. In fact only clause (2) of
§14(e) resembles § 10(b). Thus, case law under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(1) and (3) may
be suitable precedent for "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative" acts under § 14(e)
but not for the material misstatements or omissions proscribed in the first clause of
§ 14(e). In the district court opinion prior to the Second Circuit's oft-quoted decision,
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969),
the lower court found that ICC had violated Rule 10b-5(3) and also § 14(e) "which...
'in substance makes the provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 applicable to tender
offers,' and particularly that portion of Section 14(e) which proscribes engaging 'in any
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices .... ' " 295 F. Supp. 1063,
1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (emphasis added). The court further noted that "the similarities
of language and purpose between Sections 10(b) and 14(e) are such as to suggest that
the standards of Rule 10b-5 are appropriate standards for the interpretation of the
portion of Section 14(e) relevant in this case." Id. (emphasis added). Here, where a
series of statements were found to be deliberately misleading, thus qualifying them as
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices," the district court appar-
ently recognized a basis for possible distinction between the first and second clauses
of § 14(e). Unfortunately, the Second Circuit did not make this distinction, and that
opinion has been cited ever since as authority for viewing § 14(e) in its entirety through
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
'This is not, of course, to say that Congress did not intend other substantive
elements of Rule 10b-5 actions, such as causation, which were more uniformly inter-
preted to be extended to § 14(e). Unlike these other elements, when courts look to Rule
10b-5 precedent for scienter guidance, factors other than the Rule's plain meaning are
necessarily included.
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conflict among the federal circuits.8 5 Giving this more appropriate
effect to the language of § 14(e) results in the independent vitality of
its clauses8 and indicates that a negligence standard is appropriate
for the first clause of the provision."
Although nowhere in the scant legislative history of § 14(e) is
there specific mention of scienter or negligence, some general consid-
erations of the legislative history and purpose of the Williams Act
support the conclusion that liability under § 14(e) may be incurred
through the negligent misstatement or omission of material facts.
One illuminating aspect of § 14(e) and the accompanying disclosure
provisions of the Williams Act pertaining to tender offers is their
similarity to the proxy rules and regulations.8 Particularly notewor-
thy is the proxy antifraud provision, Rule 14a-9,8 the language of
87The only appellate courts which have considered private actions for damages
under § 14(e) are the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits, none of which are "negligence"
circuits under Rule 10b-5. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. May 8, 1974) (No. 73,671); H.K.
Porter, Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
"See text accompanying notes 16-27 supra.
"This result should follow, despite an argument raised by Judge Mansfield in
Chris-Craft. In Rule 15cl-2(b) under the 1934 Act, the Commission restrictively de-
fined language similar to that contained in both Rule 10b-5(2) and the first clause of
§ 14(e) to be limited to any material misstatement or omission which is made "with
knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading." Since this
rule was promulgated pursuant to Securities Exchange Act § 15(c)(1), which like
§ 10(b) prohibits "any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contriv-
ance," the limitation has been considered significant for purposes of determining
whether liability may be imposed under Rule 10b-5(2) for merely negligent misstate-
ments or omissions. See 6 L. Loss, SEcuRmas REGULATION 3884 (Supp. 1969). In Chris-
Craft, Judge Mansfield cited the Rule 15cl-2(b) definition, asserting that the language
of Rule 10b-5(2) and presumably that of § 14(e) should be similarly interpreted, thus
negating liability for negligent misleading statements or omissions. 480 F.2d at 398.
However, the analogy once again is unpersuasive with respect to § 14(e), since that
provision is not subject to any authorizing legislation which connotes a scienter re-
quirement, as are § 10(b) and § 15(c)(1). See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
mCompare Rules 14d-1, 14d-4 and Schedules 13D and 14D, discussed at note 17
supra, with Rule 14a-11 and Schedule 14B. Similarities include the fact that both the
tender offer and proxy provisions are binding on both sides in contest situations. See
1 A. BROMBERG § 6.3 (220); Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Takeover Bids: Gap in
Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 499, 511-14 (1967). See also Loss,
The Role of Rule 10b-5 in Tender Offers, SEC. REG. & TRANSFER REP. (Jan. 1969)
(noting that § 14(e) is closer in spirit to the proxy rules than to Rule lOb-5).
"Rule 14a-9 reads in part:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means
of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other
communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at
the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made,
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which is very similar to that of the first clause of § 14(e). Signifi-
cantly, in private damage actions for violations of Rule 14a-9, liabil-
ity has been premised on the negligence of the defendant.9"
Both Rule 14a-9 and the first clause of § 14(e) prohibit misstate-
ments and omissions of material facts in their separate but related
fields of operation. In this manner, each provision imposes a duty of
disclosure on persons engaged in activities contemplated within the
respective provisions. The proper standard for imposing liability in
private damage actions under either Rule 14a-9 or § 14(e) will depend
on the nature and extent of this duty of disclosure, and the degree of
care necessary for its satisfaction.' Under Rule 14a-9, courts have
agreed that the duty of disclosure will not be satisfied, and liability
may attach, when a defendant has made statements which he knew
or should have known were materially false or misleading 92-in other
words on a showing of negligence. The similarity of both purpose and
intended effect in Rule 14a-9 and § 14(e), taken together with their
similar proscriptive language, may warrant extrapolation of the case
law under Rule 14a-9 as precedent for a negligence standard under
the first clause of § 14(e) .13
The legislative history of the Williams Act evidences frequent
recognition of the basic similarity between tender offers and proxy
is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement
in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false
or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1973).
'0See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Gould v.
American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972); Berman v. Thomson,
312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970);
Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"In determining who should be held liable under § 14(e), the court in Chris-Craft
noted that "[tihe initial inquiry in each case is what duty of disclosure the law should
impose upon the person being sued." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). In White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussed at note 41 supra), the Ninth Circuit agreed with
this statement in Chris-Craft but determined that a further requirement of scienter
was unnecessary, stating that it was "unfortunate that the Second Circuit attempted
to limit this duty by requiring some degree of scienter or culpability and holding that
mere negligent conduct would not be sufficient for liability." Id. at 95,607.
"Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"3See 2 A. BROMBERG § 8.4 (441-42).
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contests. Indeed, language in both the House Report 4 and a state-
ment by then-SEC Chairman Cohen " indicates that the nature and
extent of disclosure contemplated in the tender offer disclosure re-
quirements was similar to that accomplished in the existing legisla-
tion and Commission regulation covering proxies." This conclusion
is supported by the nature of the particular disclosure provisions
themselves,97 and the similarity of the underlying shareholder activ-
ity protected. As Chairman Cohen observed,98 both tender offers and
proxy contests involve a decision by shareholders on the future com-
position of management. The specific tender offer disclosure provi-
sions of the Williams Act are designed to insure that target sharehold-
ers receive enough information to make such choices intelligently99
and, in this respect, are similar in philosophy to the proxy rules. In
each situation the effect of a potential change in management and
9 The House Report accompanying the Williams Act included the following lan-
guage:
The cash tender offer is similar to a proxy contest, and the committee
could find no reason to continue the present gap in the Federal securi-
ties laws which leaves the cash tender offer exempt from disclosure
provisions . . . . This bill is designed to make the relevant facts
known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make their
decision.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813
(1968). The tender offer antifraud provision § 14(e) appears in Securities Exchange
Act § 14, which is labelled "Proxies."
5At the House Hearings on the Williams Bill, Chairman Cohen Noted:
The procedures provided by the bills in the case of contested
tender offers are analogous to those now followed when contending
factions solicit proxies under the Commission's proxy rules. These
rules. . . are generally accepted as having been successful in provid-
ing adequate and accurate information to shareholders in contests for
control of their companies. While there are obvious differences be-
tween tender offers and proxy contests, there is in both situations the
common element of concern with the future management and control
of the company. Adequate material information is equally important
to a shareholder who is faced with a decision whether to sell his securi-
ties or retain his investment in the company.
Hearings on H.R. 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
"An effective closing of the "gap" would require no less. See note 94 supra.
"See note 88 supra.
"See note 95 supra.
"'The House Report reflects this concern with ensuring that shareholders are able
to make informed decisions:
The persons seeking control, however, have information about them-
selves and about their plans which, if known to investors, might sub-
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control is crucial to the investor's decision,"' and in both instances
the shareholder is in a position to hasten or impede such a change. '
The analogy between the proxy and tender offer situations is not
exact, however. Admittedly, a shareholder who disposes of all his
shares in response to a tender offer has not decided meaningfully in
favor of incumbent management or the outside challengers, since he
no longer has an interest in the corporation." 2 Nevertheless, a share-
stantially change the assumptions on which the market price is based.
This bill is designed to make the relevant facts known so that share-
holders have a fair opportunity to make their decision.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813
(1968).
"'In the House Hearings, SEC Chairman Cohen further noted:
It is argued by some that the basic factor which influences sharehold-
ers to accept a tender offer is the adequacy of the price. But. . . how
can an investor evaluate the adequacy of the price if he cannot assess
the possible impact of a change in control? Certainly without such
information he cannot judge its adequacy by the current or recent
market price. That price presumably reflects the assumption that the
company's present business control and management will continue.
House Hearings at 13. The identity and future plans of management are considerations
which all rational investors presumably evaluate in making investment decisions. The
shareholder in a proxy contest makes such an investment decision when he casts his
vote for or against incumbent management. The target shareholder in a tender offer
makes a similar investment decision when he determines whether he will tender or
retain his shares. Equal protection should be afforded shareholders making these anal-
ogous investment decisions, under the corresponding antifraud provisions, Rule 14a-9
and § 14(e).
"'The decision of a shareholder in a proxy situation is definitive, either in favor
of incumbent management or the outside challenger. The decisions of shareholders in
tender offer situations may be somewhat ambiguous, however, because of the conflict-
ing interests which may lead shareholders to adopt similar courses of action. For
example, a shareholder who favors current management may retain his shares in the
hope of contributing to the defeat of a takeover attempt, or he may tender part or all
of his shares because he fears that the tender offer will succeed and that incumbent
management will be supplanted. On the other hand, a shareholder who dislikes present
management may keep his shares as an investment in what he trusts will be a company
under new management, or he may tender part of his holdings to assist the takeover.
"'The facts of Smallwood present another situation in which shareholders could
not make a meaningful management choice pursuant to a tender offer. In that case, a
merger of Smallwood and Southdown was planned, with Smallwood shareholders to
receive Southdown stock. Under the terms of the merger agreement, Smallwood share-
holders were then given an opportunity to tender a maximum of 45% of the Southdown
stock so distributed. The Fifth Circuit defined Southdown's unopposed offer to pur-
chase-which offer was a necessary element of the merger agreement, and was condi-
tioned upon successful completion of the merger-as a tender offer subject to § 14(e).
489 F.2d at 596-99 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. May
8, 1974) (No. 73,671). The only alternatives presented to Smallwood shareholders were
to remain under the future management of the survivor Southdown, or to bail out by
[Vol. XXXI
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holder who declines to tender his shares, or who tenders only a part
of his shares, retains an investment in the corporation and in effect
has made a choice in management.' 3 The fact that shareholders in
tender offer situations are given the opportunity to relinquish all their
shares, thereby separating themselves from the corporation, should
not eliminate the concurrent opportunity to make the same manage-
ment choice that shareholders make in proxy situations. Unless he is
apprised of material information to the same extent as a shareholder
in a proxy contest, the target shareholder cannot meaningfully decide
whether to retain his shares and thus maintain present manage-
ment.' °4 This is a choice which he should be afforded.
The contention that the required disclosure for tender offers
should equal that for proxy solicitations is reinforced by the observa-
tion that the tender offer is an alternative to a proxy contest as a
means of acquiring corporate control. An apparent contradiction
arises in permitting corporate officials choosing a takeover technique
to render thereby a unilateral decision on the standard of care for
disclosure. To insure that shareholders may make informed decisions
on management, the fair corporate suffrage principle underlying the
proxy rules has thus been extended to tender offers in the form of the
disclosure requirements of § 14(d). 11 Imposition of a negligence stan-
dard under the analogous antifraud provision, the first clause of §
14(e), should logically follow, so that the intent to establish a similar
duty of disclosure and thereby guarantee equal shareholder protec-
tion under the alternative takeover techniques will not be frustrated.
On the other hand, since the significant hearing and committee
comments'0 were not directed specifically to § 14(e), an argument
may arise that the proxy analogy extends no further than the specific
tendering their shares. This option hardly presented an opportunity to make a mean-
ingful choice in management. However, the applicability of § 14(e) in these circum-
stances, pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's interpretations of "tender offer," should be
considered the exception rather than the rule, because in far more instances target
shareholders are presented with a real management choice. Furthermore, in
Smallwood the target shareholders had already made their management decision in
approving the merger agreement via proxy vote, under the protection of Rule 14a-9.
Id. at 586-87, 601-05.
"nNote, The Scope of Section 14(d): What Is A Tender Offer?, 34 OHIO ST. L.J.
375 (1973).
'Nor can a shareholder meaningfully decide to tender part of his shares and keep
part, in an attempt to assist the takeover effort while retaining an investment in the
corporation, which he anticipates will come under new management.
"'See note 17 supra. The inclusion of these disclosure requirements in the Wil-
liams Act indicates a congressional interest in more than merely relaxing the standing
requirement under Rule 10b-5. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text supra.
'"See notes 94-95 supra.
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affirmative disclosure requirements legislatively created. Further-
more, there are some dissimilarities between the proxy and tender
offer antifraud provisions.' The only comment directed specifically
toward § 14(e) in the committee reports stated:
This provision would affirm the fact that persons engaged in
making or opposing tender offers or otherwise seeking to influ-
ence the decisions of investors or the outcome of the tender
offer are under an obligation to make full disclosure of material
information to those with whom they deal.'
One court has concluded from this comment that "§ 14(e) was not
adopted as wholly separate and distinct from 10b-5, but rather, was
intended by Congress to 'affirm' the applicability to tender offers of
the standards of disclosure in Rule 10b-5." However, since the scope
of Rule 10b-5 with respect to all persons acting in connection with
tender offers was uncertain at the time, 10 a more logical interpreta-
tion of this strong disclosure language is that § 14(e) was intended to
"affirm" the notion that the rationale of the disclosure requirements
of § 14(d)"' was to be accorded broad application.
By itself, the legislative history of the Williams Act does not con-
clusively establish a negligence standard for imposing liability in
private damage actions under § 14(e) for misstatements or omissions
of material facts. By the same token there is no affirmative indication
that a scienter requirement should be imposed under the first clause
of § 14(e). Unless the Commission promulgates rules restricting that
clause," 2 nothing will indicate that its operation was intended to be
limited by a scienter requirement. Rather, the overall legislative con-
cern for full and fair disclosure and the frequent parallel with the
proxy regulatory scheme, coupled with the similarity in language
'nFor example, § 14(e) encompasses all tender offers, even those not regulated
under § 14(d), while Rule 14a-9 is confined to regulated proxy solicitations. Further-
more, tender offerors need not deliver the offers to shareholders individually, whereas
proxy statements must be delivered in conjunction with proxy solicitations.
1 8H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2811,
2821 (1968).
"'Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 92,591 at 98,705 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (dicta). Note, however, that this district
court is located in the Seventh Circuit, traditionally a Rule lOb-5 "negligence" circuit.
See note 28 supra.
"'See note 9 supra.
"'See note 17 supra.
'"The SEC could adopt an interpretation of the first clause of § 14(e) similar to
that adopted for Rule 15cl-2(b), see note 87 supra, but such a possibility is seemingly
remote. See Speech by SEC Commissioner Sommers, Directors and the Federal Secur-
ities Laws, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,669 (Feb. 21, 1974).
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with Rule 14a-9, indicate that a negligence standard is appropriate.1 13
From examination of the language of § 14(e), its history and pur-
pose, and its relation to the other provisions of the securities laws, a
number of conclusions may be drawn which support the contention
that the operative clauses of § 14(e) should be applied separately, and
that liability under the provision may be incurred for negligent mis-
statements or omissions of material facts. First, nothing in the word-
ing of § 14(e) establishes that scienter must be shown in a private
action for damages arising from misleading statements in tender of-
fers, or in communications to shareholders endorsing or disapproving
such offers. Further, neither that part of the case history of Rule 10b-
5 requiring scienter, nor any other antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties laws, necessitates inferring such a scienter requirement. Section
14(e) is not limited by any authorizing legislation connoting scienter,
as Rule 10b-5 may be by § 10(b), nor is it nearly as broad in scope as
Rule 10b-5. Finally, there is no indication from Congress that scienter
was intended in the first clause of § 14(e). Rather, the legislative
history evidences an intention on the part of Congress to extend to
tender offers the same affirmative disclosure requirements embodied
in previous congressional enactments and in the SEC rules for proxy
contests. A logical extension of this philosophy to an analogy between
the respective antifraud provisions, § 14(e) and Rule 14a-9, suggests
a negligence standard for the first clause of § 14(e). When all these
factors are considered, one must conclude that nothing should pre-
vent a judicial determination that negligence is the proper standard
for determining liability for damages under the first clause of § 14(e).
Indeed, other considerations encourage such an interpretation. In
light of the large number of shareholders who may place great reli-
ance on the information they receive in tender offer situations, the
interested parties should properly be held to a standard requiring a
reasonable investigation and examination of statements contained or
omitted in communications to those shareholders."1
"'At least one state has statutorily created a negligence standard under its equiva-
lent of the first clause of § 14(e), but only with respect to offerors. The Virginia Take-
Over Bid Disclosure Act contains a provision which, although labeled "Deceptive
practices," reproduces exactly the first and second clauses of § 14(e), differing from
that provision only in its description of the coverage of the operative clauses. VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-533 (RepI. Vol. 1973). The Virginia Act also contains a provision which
imposes liability on any offeror who makes a take-over bid by means of misstatements
or omissions of material facts and who cannot prove that he "did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known" of the material misstatements
or omissions. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-539(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
'"Inapplicable should be the argument that a high standard of care, i.e., a negli-
gence standard, placed on corporate officials will decrease the amount of information
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The application of a negligence standard under the first clause of
§ 14(e) will depend upon whether courts look beyond the dicta of
early § 14(e) cases" 5 to examine those factors distinguishing § 14(e)
from Rule 10b-5 with respect to standard of fault. The courts in
Chris-Craft and Smallwood failed in this respect, relying on the simi-
larity in language with Rule 10b-5 to establish a scienter standard
under § 14(e). In so doing, those courts declined to exercise the cau-
tion urged by the Supreme Court when examining the securities
laws" and may have initiated a conflict between the circuits similar
to that surrounding Rule 10b-5."7 Courts subsequently applying §
14(e) should examine closely the reasons for interpreting it apart from
Rule 10b-5 and give full effect to the investor-protecting language in
that antifraud provision, thereby rescuing the provision from the
overcrowded "cauldron in which the oracles continue to stew."" 8
PETER R. KOLYER
voluntarily extended to shareholders, thus defeating the congressional purpose of en-
couraging disclosure. The affirmative disclosure requirements of the Williams Act
prevent total non-disclosure, and communications to shareholders will almost cer-
tainly be forthcoming from both management and offeror in contested tender offer
situations.
Interestingly, an extrapolation of the "flexible duty standard" approach of the
Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974), to § 14(e) should result
in the imposition of a high duty of disclosure on defendants in most tender offer
situations. As some of the factors to be considered in determining a defendant's duty
of disclosure, the White court included:
the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's
access to the information as compared to the plaintiffs access, the
benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, the defen-
dant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their rela-
tionship in making his investment decisions, and the defendant's ac-
tivity in initiating the securities transaction in question.
495 F.2d at 735-36 (footnotes omitted). See note 41 supra.
"5E.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969) (an action for injunctive relief, not specifically concerned with the scienter-
negligence issue).
"'When interpreting § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for the first time, the Supreme Court
prefaced its opinion as follows:
We enter this virgin territory cautiously. The questions presented are
narrow ones. They arise in an area where glib generalizations and
unthinking abstractions are major occupational hazards.
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
"'Both Chris-Craft and Smallwood were decided by Rule 10b-5 "scienter" circuits.
When given a similar opportunity to interpret § 14(e), presumably the "negligence"
circuits will decide on a negligence standard, thus precipitating conflict.
"'Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T
92,826 at 90,103 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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THE BIRNBAUM RULE REJECTED: WILL
ANALYSIS OF RIGHT TO BRING PRIVATE ACTION
UNDER § 10(b) BE SIMPLIFIED?
Section 10(b)' of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5, 2 which was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission pursuant to that section, make unlawful the use of any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."3 Originally this section was enforceable only by
public action instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
However, the courts became aware that the purpose of the Act would
largely be frustrated unless private parties were allowed to bring
actions to enforce the provisions of § 10(b). Thus, in 1946, the now
firmly established private right of action under that section was first
recognized.4
'Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) provides in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors.
2Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant
to authority given by § 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
3See note 2 supra.
'A private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was first recognized in
Kardon v. National Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Although private rights
of action under the Securities Exchange Act were tacitly approved by the Supreme
Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), a case involving § 14(a) of the
Act, the Court did not specifically recognize a private right of action under § 10(b)
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Having recognized a private right of action under § 10(b), the
courts necessarily had to confront the additional problem of delineat-
ing the class of persons entitled to bring suit under § 10(b). 5 The
language of both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is too broad effectively to
identify the class protected by their provisions. Yet, without some
specification of the class protected and the type of activity pro-
scribed, the benefits of private actions under the section would be
outweighed by the detrimental effect on business activity.' The lib-
eral service of process and venue provisions of the Act could allow
suits brought only for their nuisance value,7 and legitimate security
transactions could be discouraged because of uncertainty about pos-
sible liability under the section.'
until 1971. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?,
57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963); Comment, Securities Regulation-Civil Liability Under
Rule X-lOB-5 for Fraud in the Purchase or Sale of Securities, 52 MICH. L. REv. 893
(1954).
In a private action under § 10(b) the plaintiff may sue for damages or for recission.
If the suit is for recission, the purchase price may be recovered in the case of a purchase
and the securities may be recovered in the case of a sale. In an action for damages,
the defrauded buyer can recover the difference between the market value of the securi-
ties on the date of sale and the price paid plus any incidental damages. These are the
so-called out-of-pocket damages. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). See also Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970). In a damage action, a defrauded seller can avail
himself of the constructive trust to recover any profits the buyer may have gained. :See,
e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified, 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
Section 28(a) of the Act limits recovery in damage actions to actual damages, thus
precluding punitive damages. De Hass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th
Cir. 1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037
(1970). See Hirsch and Lewis, Punitive Damage Awards Under the Federal Securities
Acts, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 72 (1971).
See 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5 § 9.1-9.2 (1973);
JENNINGS AND MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1185-87 (1972); Weiskopf, Remedies
Under Rule 10b-5, 45 ST. J.L. REv. 733 (1971); Comment, Private Remedies Available
Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620 (1966).
5Otherwise stated, the issue is one of how far the protection of § 10(b) should be
extended. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1970).
OThe determination of the right to bring suit under § 10(b) involves a balancing
of factors, including the protection of investors and the national interest in a strong
business community. Id. at 804.
7Securities Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
'The Supreme Court has noted that "§ 10(b) and Rule l0b-5 may well be the most
litigated provisions in the federal securities laws .... SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
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The courts have therefore developed limitations on the private
right of action under § 10(b). 9 One such limitation is the rule first
announced in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co.,"0 known as the
purchaser-seller requirement or the Birnbaum rule. In Birnbaum the
Second Circuit actually announced two limitations." After consider-
ing the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court stated that:
[Section 10(b)] was directed solely at that type of misrepre-
sentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the
sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs, and that Rule X-10b-5 ex-
tended only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.
2
The first part of the holding limits the type of activity proscribed to
that involving the purchase or sale of securities and excludes suits
based on corporate mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty.
These matters were deemed the proper subject of state corporate
law. 3 The second part limits the class of persons entitled to sue under
§ 10(b) to those who have been defrauded in their own purchase or
sale of securities. While this limitation has generally been considered
a standing requirement, there is question whether it can be equated
'For a discussion of these limiting doctrines, see Boone and McGowan, Standing
to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEx. L. Rav. 617, 619 (1971), and Bromberg, Are
There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus LAw. 167 (1974).
"-193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
"The facts of Birnbaum showed that Feldmann, the president and chairman of
the board of Newport, owned 40 percent of the stock in Newport Steel Co. This owner-
ship gave him working control. Newport was negotiating a merger with another steel
manufacturer which would have been highly profitable to Newport's stockholders.
Feldmann, acting in his official capacity rejected the merger offer and instead sold his
stock for twice the current market price to a syndicate made up of Newport's custom-
ers. The plaintiff brought suit under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a representative of the
minority shareholders and derivatively on behalf of Newport. He alleged fraud in that
Feldmann made certain misrepresentations to the stockholders of Newport in letters
sent to them at the time of the negotiations with Follansbee Steel Corp. and again after
Feldmann sold his stock.
11193 F.2d at 464.
3One commentator has observed that the broad claim that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 were inteaded to remedy situations of corporate mismanagement and breaches of
fiduciary duty may have been the reason for the strict interpretation in Birnbaum.
Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 725, 834 (1956). For a
detailed consideration of this aspect of Birnbaum, see Roantree, The Continuing De-
velopment of Rule 1Ob-5 as a Means of Enforcing the Fiduciary Duties of Directors and
Controlling Shareholders, 34 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 201 (1972); Ryan, Bankers Life: Birn-
baum Reconsidered, 4 LOYOLA U. OF CHI. L.J. 47 (1973).
Many commentators have argued that § 10(b) has resulted in a federal law of
corporations. See, e.g., Bahlman, Rule 10b-5; The Case for its Full Acceptance as
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with standing under Article III of the Constitution." However, the
development of the purchaser-seller requirement shows that it is used
as a description of both the injury which may be remedied and the
persons intended to be protected by § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.15
In spite of the apparent simplicity of the decision in Birnbaum,
the rule announced in that case has been the subject of continuing
controversy. This controversy results from indecision over whether
the rule is a necessary limitation or simply judicial surplusage." The
courts have been reluctant to apply the rule strictly, since a rigid
application would often frustrate the intent of the Act, i.e., protection
of the investing public.' 7 The conflict between the need for flexibility
on the one hand and the necessity of a limiting doctrine 8 on the other
has been partially resolved by a liberal application of the Birnbaum
rule. This has been accomplished by an expansive reading of the
words "purchase" and "sale" and of the "in connection with" lan-
guage of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.19 A recent case, International Con-
trols Corp. v. Vesco,20 illustrates the expansive reading given to the
Federal Corporate Law, 37 CiN. L. REV. 727 (1968); Fleischer, "Federal Corporate
Law:" An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965); Ruder, Current Developments
in Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5,
26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of
Corporations by Implications Through 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964).
"See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
'5Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805-07 (1970).
"Some courts and commentators are of the opinion that the rule serves a necessary
purpose in defining the class of persons to be protected by § 10(b). Boone and McGo-
wan, supra note 9, at 648. Others believe the rule should be abolished because it could
deny standing to persons meant to be protected by the Act. Also the rule unnecessarily
complicates securities law which diverts attention from substantive issues. Since the
rule is inflexible, it is contrary to the rlings requiring flexible construction of securities
laws. Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule 10b-5 Reevaluated, 44
COLO. L. REV. 151 (1972).
"See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 800-01 (5th Cir. 1970).
"Other doctrines limiting private actions under § 10(b), such as materiality, reli-
ance, privity and causation, have been minimized or abolished and no longer bar
actions under § 10(b). For the extent to which these limitations are still of force and
effect, see Bromberg, supra note 9.
"One court has said, "The definitions of purchase and sale have sagged under the
weight of courts' attempts to prevent ingenious minds from deflecting the statutory
purposes of Section 10(b)." Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 590 (5th
Cir. 1974).
In the Act, purchase is defined as follows: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each
include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Securities Exchange Act
§ 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970). Sale is defined as follows: "The terms 'sale'
and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Securities Ex-
change Act § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970).
2490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974).
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words of § 10(b) in order to meet the purchaser-seller requirement.
International Controls and other cases which have been decided
within the framework of the Birnbaum rule constitute a body of law
which offers guidance to the courts and insures some degree of con-
sistency in deciding whether a plaintiff can bring a private action
under § 10(b).
In another recent case, Eason v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.,2' the Seventh Circuit held that the Birnbaum rule "is not part
of the law of this circuit." The court apparently objected to the
strained analysis necessitated by this expansive application of the
purchaser-seller requirement and considered the requirement no
more than judicial surplusage. After rejecting the purchaser-seller
requirement, the court predicated the right to bring a private action
on three requirements: the plaintiff must have standing, the plaintiff
must be protected by the Act, and there must not be overriding policy
considerations which would defeat the claim.2 The decision appears
to be an attempt to simplify the process of determining whether a
given plaintiff may bring a private action. However, the actual effect
of the Eason decision cannot be assessed without considering the
cases which modified the strict Birnbaum rule.
Under the strict Birnbaum rule, the plaintiff had to be either a
defrauded purchaser or seller, the transaction had to be between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and the defendant had to be the perpe-
trator of the fraud. The cases which have modified this strict
purchaser-seller requirement can be divided into four categories.Y In
each of these categories, private plaintiffs have been allowed to bring
suit under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, even though they would not have
been considered purchasers or sellers under the Birnbaum rule as
originally announced.
21490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974).
2Id. at 661.
11Id. at 656.
21These four categories are proposed in Boone and McGowan, supra note 9, but
other groupings have been suggested. See JENNINGS AND MARCH, SEcuRrrIIs REGULATION
1182-83 (1972), (forced seller, aborted seller, frustrated seller, would-be seller injunc-
tive plaintiff); Ruder, Current Developments, supra note 13 (holder of shares, deriva-
tive actions, forced sellers, mergers and liquidations, injunctions); Comment, The
Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 14 VIL. L. REv. 499 (1969)
(corporate issues, abortive seller, constructive seller).
Some commentators have considered mergers a separate category but the cases
involving mergers can be placed in one of the four categories suggested by Boone and
McGowan, such as abortive transactions or derivative suits. For a discussion of cases
which have dealt with mergers under § 10(b), see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579, 590 n.10 (5th Cir. 1974).
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The cases in the first of these categories, the "abortive transac-
tion," are distinguishable from other cases under § 10(b) in that the
alleged fraud prevented consummation of the transaction. A. T. Brod
& Co. v. Perlow15 was the first case based on this rationale.26 In that
case, the defendant ordered securities intending to pay for them only
if the market price had risen by the settlement date. On one occasion
the price of the ordered securities declined and the defendant refused
payment, thereby forcing the broker to sell the securities at a loss of
$3,330.2 The broker subsequently brought suit under § 10(b) to re-
cover this amount. The court considered the purchase of shares for
subsequent sale to the defendant a purchase of securities. However,
the court did not expand the words purchase or sale but did expand
the right to sue under § 10(b) by interpreting broadly the "in connec-
tion with" language of § 10(b).2 The purchase and sale was between
the plaintiff and a third party, while the fraud was between the
plaintiff and the defendant. The court noted that the Act was in-
tended to protect not only investors but also the public interest, 9 and
it applied the "in connection with" language broadly to allow the
broker to bring suit.
The second category of cases which relaxed the purchaser-seller
requirement involves "constructive transactions" and can be illus-
trated by Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co."0 In Vine, the plaintiff al-
leged that Beneficial had fraudulently gained control of Crown Fi-
-375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
2'For other cases, see, e.g., Goodman v. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill.
1967), and Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
In Goodman, the plaintiffs' broker would represent that he was purchasing and
selling securities when in fact either the purchases and sales were never made or the
securities never existed. The court held that, since the plaintiffs would have been
purchasers or sellers but for the fraud of the broker, they could bring suit under
§ 10(b).
In Stockwell, the plaintiffs asked the defendant broker to sell their shares in a
certain corporation. The broker made misrepresentations as to the financial condition
of the company and the reasons for the recent drop in the price of the company's stock,
and these misrepresentations allegedly induced the plaintiffs to refrain from selling.
The court allowed suit under § 10(b) because the fraud induced the plaintiffs to keep
the stock and caused their loss.
1375 F.2d at 395.
'Id. at 396. The court relied on a statement made by the Supreme Court that the
securities laws should not be construed "technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate . . . [their] remedial purposes." Id., quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
2375 F.2d at 396.
-374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
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nance Co., of which he was a stockholder.' After gaining control of
Crown, Beneficial effected a short-form merger" which forced the
shareholders of Crown either to sell to Beneficial at a discount or to
hold worthless stock in Crown. With little discussion, the court held
that the plaintiff was a seller of securities to Beneficial because Bene-
ficial's alleged fraud had left the plaintiff with no choice of action.
Thus, the court dealt with the plaintiff as if he had sold his stock to
Beneficial." The constructive transaction rationale has been fre-
quently utilized to give protection to defrauded shareholders. 4
Derivative suits comprise the third category of cases which had
eased the harshness of the strict purchaser-seller requirement. The
rationale of this category is that the shareholder in a derivative suit
assumes the position of the defrauded corporation for the purposes of
§ 10(b). Thus, the shareholder can maintain a derivative suit on
behalf of the corporation without being a purchaser or seller, provided
the corporation can be considered a purchaser or seller. Ruckle v.
Roto American Corp.3 was one of the earliest cases decided in this
category. In Ruckle, the plaintiff, a shareholder of Roto American,
brought suit to enjoin that corporation from reissuing 7,000 shares of
treasury stock. The complaint alleged that the board of directors of
Roto American had been induced to approve the issuance of the
shares by the withholding of financial statements by the defendant
directors. The court noted that, unless the corporation brought suit,
the perpetrators of the fraud would be insulated from legal action.
This result was considered improper and the shareholder was allowed
therefore to bring a derivative action under § 10(b).
3
1
3'Id. at 630. The plaintiff alleged fraud in that Beneficial purchased the Class A
stock at a premium while offering to purchase the Class B stock at a discount. The
Class B shareholders were thus unable to sell their shares for a fair price. Id. at 631.
2A short-form merger provision in a state's corporation law allows the merger of a
parent corporation and a subsidiary by a simple resolution of the parent's board of
directors, if the parent owns a certain percentage of the subsidiary's outstanding stock.
The subsidiary's remaining stockholders have no voice in the matter. Delaware re-
quires the parent to own at least 90% of each class of the subsidiary's stock and New
York requires 95% ownership. DEL. CODE ANN. tits. 8, 9 § 253 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 905 (McKinney 1963).
3"The court cited Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964), and
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961), as supporting a broad construction of the word "sale." 374 F.2d at
634.
"'See, e.g., Coffee v. Permiam Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). Contra, Iroquois Indus., Inc.
v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
3"339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
"'In Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970), the court considered well-
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The fourth category of cases involves suits for injunctive relief. In
these cases the Birnbaum rule has been virtually eliminated, a devel-
opment attributable to the Supreme Court's statement that "[i]t is
not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish
all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages. ' 37 In
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.31 the Second Circuit seized on
this language to allow the minority shareholders to bring a suit en-
joining the controlling shareholders from manipulating the market
price of the stock and from keeping dividends low. The plaintiffs
alleged that by these actions the majority shareholders were attempt-
ing to force the minority shareholders to sell at depressed levels. In
Mutual Shares, the minority shareholders had not sold their stock.
However, since the plaintiffs desired to continue their ownership in
the company, the court considered counterproductive the require-
ment that the shareholders sell their stock before being allowed to
bring suit.
39
Some commentators ° and at least one court4' have interpreted the
established the principle that "[t]he private right of action implied under Rule 10b-
5 may be invoked on behalf of a corporation in a shareholder's derivative suit." Id. at
803. See also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Shell v.
Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969).
3SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963). While the
case involved the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. (1970),
the court's language was not limited to suits under that statute.
-384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
11Id. at 547. Although the rationale for eliminating the purchaser-seller require-
ment in injunctive actions has not been explicitly stated, it would seem to be that the
plaintiff in injunctive actions evidences a desire to remain a shareholder in the corpora-
tion. Under this rationale other equitable actions would still require the plaintiff to fit
within the purchaser-seller requirement.
For cases reaching a result similar to Mutual Shares, see, e.g., Kahan v. Rosen-
stiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969).
See Ruder, Current Developments, supra note 13, at 1300; Comment, The Purchaser-
Seller Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 ComEL L. Rv. 684 (1968).
"°See Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-
5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Comment, Inroads on the Necessity for a Consummated
Purchase or Sale Under Rule 10b-5, 1969 DUKE L.J. 349; Comment, The Purchaser-
Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEO. L.J.
1177 (1968).
"Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. N.Y. 1967). Judge Bonsal originally dis-
missed the complaint in Entel but, after his decisions in Vine and Brod were both
reversed, he granted a rehearing and allowed the plaintiff to bring suit under § 10(b).
The judge said in Entel, "Although this court feels that the extension of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 to non-purchasers-or-sellers and to 'all fraudulent schemes' would be
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cases relaxing the strict Birnbaum rule as signaling the abolition of
the purchaser-seller requirement. However, cases such as Greenstein
v. Paul 2 demonstrated that, while the courts have been willing to
expand the right to sue under § 10(b) in order to further the purpose
of the Act, the purchaser-seller requirement has not been rejected. In
speaking of the requirement, the Greenstein court noted that
"[a]lthough criticized . . . it is still the rule at least insofar as ac-
tions for damages are concerned."43
Even though the cases which modified the strict purchaser-seller
requirement seemed to provide a framework within which to consider
cases involving the Birnbaum rule, confusion persisted regarding the
scope and viability of the requirement. For this reason, the Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life and Casualty Co.44 was thought to evidence the Court's desire to
provide a definitive ruling on the scope of the purchaser-seller re-
quirement.15 The alleged fraud in Bankers Life occurred during a
complicated financial transaction. 6 Manhattan Casualty Co. was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Bankers Life. The defendants included
Bankers Life, its directors, and the men who purchased the stock of
Manhattan from Bankers Life. The plaintiff alleged that Manhattan
was purchased with its own assets. Manhattan's board of directors
approved a sale of $5 million worth of treasury bonds held by Man-
hattan, based on the belief that the proceeds would be used to pur-
chase a certificate of deposit. Instead the money was used to cover
the check with which the defendants purchased all of the Manhattan
stock from Bankers Life. A certificate of deposit was in fact pur-
chased, but it was acquired with borrowed funds secured by the cer-
tificate itself. Manhattan subsequently became insolvent and the
Superintendent of Insurance brought suit under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 in Manhattan's name to recover the $5 million in assets of
better left to Congress than to judicial interpretation, it is bound to follow the decisions
of this circuit." 270 F. Supp. at 70 (emphasis in original).
12400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. , 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974).
11400 F.2d at 581 (citations omitted). In Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China
Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), the court stated explicitly that Vine and Brod "show
no retreat from the proposition that a claim under Section 10(b) must relate to a
purchase or sale as to which [the] plaintiff was defrauded." 417 F.2d at 968.
4,404 U.S. 6 (1971).
5See Boone and McGowan, supra note 9, at 649.
4 For a schematic diagram of the transaction, see Roantree, The Continuing Devel-
opment of Rule 10b-5 as a Means of Enforcing the Fiduciary Duties of Directors and
Controlling Shareholders, 34 U. PrTr. L. REv. 201, 212-13 (1972).
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which Manhattan was defrauded. The Superintendent alleged that
some of the directors of Bankers Life knew of the manipulations
involving Manhattan and acted fraudulently in failing to disclose the
dealings to the other directors.47 The Supreme Court permitted the
Superintendent to bring suit as representative of the creditors of
Manhattan.
The decision in Bankers Life involved both limitations announced
in Birnbaum.4 s As a preliminary matter, the Court found that Man-
hatten was a seller of securities by virtue of the sale of treasury bonds
and was thus protected by the Act. This step arguably shows an
implied endorsement of the purchaser-seller requirement.49 The
Court then altered that part of Birnbaum concerned with misman-
agement of corporate affairs by holding that the securities laws were
designed to regulate fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs
if the mismanagement was in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. The Court reasoned that the Act was intended to pro-
tect a "community of interests."'5' As that term was used, it described
the same class to whom the directors and majority shareholders of a
corporation owed a fiduciary duty.52 Under the Court's formulation,
a member of the community of interest could sue under § 10(b) for
a breach of fiduciary duty, provided the breach occurred in connec-
tion with a purchase or sale of securities. Therefore, in Bankers Life
the Superintendent was allowed to bring suit because he represented
the creditors of Manhattan and creditors were clearly within the pro-
tected community.
The result in Bankers Life seems to reflect the Supreme Court's
willingness to accept the modified purchaser-seller requirement.
That case, considered with the decisions which explained and
adapted the requirement, can be viewed as progressing toward a reso-
lution of the controversy over the Birnbaum rule. The rule was based
on a narrow conception of the class meant to be protected by the
Securities Exchange Act. The delineation of the class protected
"For a detailed discussion of this case, see Ryan, Bankers Life: Birnbaum Reconsi-
dered, 4 LOYOLA U. OF CHI. L.J. 47 (1973); Note, Superintendent of Insurance v.
Banker's Life: Through the Looking Glass, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 930 (1973); Comment,
Securities-Standing Under Rule lOb-5-Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), 60 GEO. L.J. 1605 (1972).
4"See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
"1404 U.S. at 9. See Roantree, supra note 46, at 214.
0404 U.S. at 12. See note 13 supra.
5"Id. at 12, citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939).
5 The term was first used in this context by the Court in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 307 (1939).
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seems to have reached the outer limits with the development in
Bankers Life of the concept of a "community of interest." By utilizing
this "community of interest" concept along with the liberal interpre-
tation of the "in connection with" language of § 10(b), courts should
be able to work within the purchaser-seller limitation while at the
same time fully implementing the purpose of the Act.
The case of International Controls Corp. v. Vesco,53 although not
directly involving the purchaser-seller limitation, illustrates the lib-
eral interpretation given to the words "purchase" and "sale" in order
to implement the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act.
International Controls was a suit instituted by that corporation to
prevent the dissipation of its assets threatened by the securities ma-
nipulations of Robert Vesco, the controlling shareholder of ICC. The
alleged fraud occurred during an intricate juggling of subsidiaries by
ICC. On June 15, 1971, Skyways, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fair-
field Aviation, itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICC, purchased a
Boeing 707 for $1,375,000. On October 1, 1971, Skyways leased the
plane to ICC for five years for a gross rental of $3,500,000. The lease
was not submitted to the board of directors of ICC for approval until
December 8, 1971. Skyways was allowed to terminate the lease upon
five days notice, with all improvements becoming the property of
Skyways. During the period between October 1 and December 8, ICC
spent between $600,000 and $700,000 to refurbish the plane for the
personal comfort of Vesco, the primary user. Also during that period,
ICC incorporated another wholly-owned subsidiary, Fairfield Gen-
eral. On December 8, 1971, before being informed of either the oner-
ous lease provisions or the expenditures on the plane, ICC's directors
approved a transfer of all Fairfield Aviation's stock to Fairfield Gen-
eral in return for all of the latter's stock. The Fairfield General stock
was then distributed to the shareholders of ICC as a dividend in kind
with the result that the plane was sheltered in a corporate shell con-
trolled by Vesco's associates." The corporation claimed that Vesco
had planned the stock transfers because of his concern that he might
lose control of ICC and thus be forced to stop his personal use of the
plane. ICC contended that the spinoff had been fraudulently induced
and should be rescinded.
ICC argued that the dividend of Fairfield General stock to the
shareholders of ICC was a sale, thus presenting the question whether
a spinoff of a subsidiary is a sale for purposes of the Securities Ex-
-490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974).
14Id. at 1342.
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change Act.5 Lacking precedental guidance56 the court turned to an
analysis of both the type of behavior proscribed and the class meant
to be protected by the statute. 7 Bankers Life was recognized as pro-
viding an umbrella of protection to the "community of interest."58
The asset drain which would result if ICC were to lose control of the
plane would detrimentally affect the shareholders and the creditors
of ICC, two groups explicitly included in the Supreme Court's formu-
lation of the community of interest. The Second Circuit concluded
that the suit by ICC would protect those meant to be protected by
the Act and thus construed the word "sale" broadly enough to include
the spinoff of the subsidiary. This broad interpretation was presuma-
bly considered necessary to extend the protection of § 10(b) to credi-
tors as required by Bankers Life."
Given the result in Bankers Life, the court in International
Controls seems to have reached the proper result. However, the dis-
sent extended the majority's reasoning and argued:
If a corporate spin-off of a "portfolio subsidiary" is a purchase
or sale simply because it involves a stock transaction or the
disposition of securities by a corporation, then a normal corpo-
rate stock dividend, a gift of shares or a distribution of securi-
ties by a fiduciary can also be found to be a purchase or sale."0
The majority countered this argument by distinguishing a dividend
of portfolio securities from an ordinary stock dividend, on the ground
that only the former involves a distribution of corporate assets.6 The
"ICC also argued chat tne exchange of Fairfield Aviation stock for that of Fairfield
General was a "sale" under Rule 10b-5. The court rejected this contention for the
reason that, both before and after the exchange, Fairfield General was a wholly owned
subsidiary of ICC. Therefore, ICC had not parted with any securities but merely dealt
with itself. Id. at 1343-44.
"ICC urged the court to adopt the reasoning of a line of cases which field that a
spinoff was a sale under the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 1344, citing SEC v. Datronics
Eng'rs, Inc., 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Stern-Haskell, Inc., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,065 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1973); SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp.
943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). These cases were distinguished in that the definition of "sale"
under the 1933 Act requires a disposition for value. Securities Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(3) (1970). In each case there was a finding that the parent corporation actually
received value for the spinoff. 490 F.2d at 1343-44.
"1490 F.2d at 1345-46.
'See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
"1490 F.2d at 1345.
'Id. at 1358.
"The court said, "a portfolio security dividend may have a substantially different
impact on creditors than an ordinary stock dividend. Since the latter does not involve
a distribution of corporate assets, corporate creditors are unlikely to be affected by a
decision to issue a stock dividend." Id. at 1346 n.14.
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majority conceded, however, that in another context the word "sale"
might be given a narrower interpretation.2
The dissent also argued that the broad interpretation given the
word "sale" would bring about the demise of the Birnbaum rule
because courts could easily label a party a seller of securities if no
consideration were required.63 However, the majority explicitly stated
that the decision was not intended to weaken the purchaser-seller
requirement:
[The] "fear" that our decision today signals the demise of the
Birnbaum doctrine . . . is wholly unfounded. Having deter-
mined that ICC's dividend of its Fairfield General portfolio
stock was the kind of meaningful disposition of securities
which Congress sought to protect under § 10(b), it could not
be more clear that ICC was the "seller" of those securities."
Thus, in International Controls, the Second Circuit reiterated the
validity of the purchaser-seller requirement, while also giving an ex-
ample of the analysis which allows retention of that requirement
without frustration of the Act's purpose.
The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, refused to apply this type of
analysis in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp." The court
deemed continued adherence to the Birnbaum rule unjustified in
view of the flexibility with which that rule has been applied to make
it coextensive with the protection of § 10(b).66 The plaintiffs in Eason
were shareholders of Bank Service Corp. and guarantors of notes
payable to GMAC. Bank Service had issued stock to defendant Waite
Pontiac as partial consideration for the purchase of Waite's automo-
'Id. at 1346.
13d. at 1359. The dissent considered the purchaser-seller requirement a necessary
limitation in that "it serves the salutary purpose of foreclosing limitless liability under
§ 10(b)." Id.
11Id. at 1346 n.16.
-490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974).
Wrhe court noted:
The language of Rule lob-5 itself describes any act or practice
which operates as a fraud or deceit "upon any person in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security." The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that this language should be given a broad and
flexible construction. Construing the words "any person" to include a
purchaser or a seller but no one else is not consistent with that admo-
nition. Nor does the so-called rule'really have integrity when the words
"purchaser" and "seller" are construed as flexibly as has been neces-
sary in order both to decide lob-5 cases properly and also to continue
to pay homage to the Birnbaum rule.
Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
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bile leasing division. Bank Service had also assumed the liabilities of
Waite, which included notes payable to GMAC. The shareholders of
Bank Service then personally guaranteed both past and future notes
payable to GMAC. When Bank Service became insolvent, GMAC
brought suit in a state court to recover on the guarantees.
The shareholders of Bank Service brought an action under
§ 10(b) alleging fraud on the part of both GMAC and Waite Pontiac
and seeking recission of the loan guarantees.17 The sole issue on ap-
peal was whether the shareholders' claim under § 10(b) was fore-
closed by the Birnbaum rule. The Seventh Circuit conceded that
Bank Service was the seller of the securities transferred to Waite, but
it refused to treat the plaintiffs as indirect sellers of that stock. 8
Under the court's interpretation of the purchaser-seller requirement,
since the shareholders were not direct sellers of the securities, their
suit would be precluded by the requirement. In order to avoid this
result, the court provided an alternative to the Birnbaum rule. That
alternative based the right to relief on three "aspects": the plaintiff
must have standing, the plaintiff must be protected by the Act, and
there must not be any overriding policy considerations which would
defeat the claim.69
In analyzing whether the plaintiffs had standing, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the generally accepted view of the Birnbaum rule as
a standing requirement. Standing, under Article EI of the Constitu-
tion, was seen as requiring only that the plaintiff have "a sufficient
interest in a real controversy with the defendant to entitle him to
invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court."" Since the plaintiffs in
Eason would be required to pay $300,000 to satisfy the guarantees,
they were thought to have a sufficient interest in the controversy. The
court then relied on Bankers Life in determining that the sharehold-
ers were within the protection of the statute.' Since no policy consid-
erations were involved which would preclude the suit, -the plaintiffs
were allowed to bring suit under § 10(b) even though the court did
not consider them either purchasers or sellers. The court summa-
rized: "If, as plaintiffs have alleged, the transaction was consum-
"Id. at 656.
"A shareholders derivative suit was inappropriate because the prayer for recission
of the personal loan guarantees could not be asserted by the corporation. A suit by the
corporation to recover its shares would have been pointless since the stock was then
worthless. See id. at 656 n.6.
"Id. at 656.
7Id. at 657, citing Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), and C. WRIGHT,
The Law of Federal Courts § 13, at 39 (1970).
1'490 F.2d at 659. See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
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mated in violation of Rule 10b-5, we believe the plaintiffs, as inves-
tors and as principals in the transaction, suffered a legal injury which
may be redressed by a federal court.
'7 2
Thus the Seventh Circuit did away with the Birnbaum rule and
attempted to provide in its place a simplified analysis. This analysis
was designed to insure that all those meant to be protected by the
Act could bring a private suit. The decision appears to be the result
of the Seventh Circuit's disagreement with the strained analysis nec-
essary to apply the modified purchaser-seller limitation in some
cases.
The court arguably could have fit the plaintiff-shareholders
within the modified purchaser-seller limitation without strained
analysis, especially in view of the holding of Bankers Life. In Bankers
Life the Superintendent was not a purchaser or seller of securities,
yet he was allowed to bring suit to protect the interests of Manhat-
tan's creditors. The creditors also were not purchasers or sellers, but
they had been defrauded "in connection with" the "sale" of securities
and were within the "community of interest." In Eason the court
refused to consider the shareholders as sellers of securities even
though they were referred to by the court as "principals" in the trans-
action with GMAC.13 In spite of this determination, the Seventh Cir-
cuit could have stressed the "in connection with" language of
§ 10(b), as did the Supreme Court in Bankers Life, to allow the
shareholders to sue under § 10(b). This result would seem even more
logical given the fact that the plaintiffs were clearly within the "com-
munity of interest."
Whether the analysis provided by the Eason court will simplify
decisions involving the right to bring private actions under § 10(b)
is open to question. If the purchaser-seller limitation is interpreted
as a description of the type of injury to be remedied and the class
protected by § 10(b), then analysis under the alternative provided by
the Seventh Circuit may be substantially the same as that under the
modified purchaser-seller requirement. The formulation of the con-
cept of a "community of interest" by the Supreme Court in Bankers
Life seems to have extended the protected class to its outer limits.
However, just as before the rejection of the Birnbaum rule, the courts
must deal withthe question of the type of injury which can be reme-
died by § 10(b). The three requirements provided by the Seventh
Circuit do not seem to answer this question.
"Id. at 659-60.
7See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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